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February 6, 1985

Honorable Willie l. Brown, Jr . , Speaker of the Assembly
Honorable Members of the Ca l ifornia State Assembly
Dear Mr. Speaker and Members:
In May 1983, Assemblyman Ri chard Katz requested the Assembly Office of
Research to investigate the feasibil i ty of a regional water trading project
within the San Joaquin Valley. With funding from the Cal i fornia Policy
Seminar and the Public Service Research and Dissemina ~ ion Program,
researchers from the University of Ca l ifornia at Davis and Hastings College
of law worked under Assembly Office of Research supervision to answer the
following questions:
t

How much water is available for trade?

• Do existing conveyance systems have the capacity to trade the
available water?
1

What are the economic benefits to se ll ers and buyers?

1

Do legal problems stand in the way of a trade agreement?

Using as an example a hypothetical water trade between severa l water
districts, the researchers found that 153,486 acre-feet of water cou d be
traded at a price that would result in substantial profits to the sel l ers
and savings to the buyers, without any adverse effects.
By way of comparison, this amount of water represents approximately 31
percent of the yield of the proposed "Through Delta Facility of 1984."
Such a trade would cost importers on ly about one-half as much per
acre-foot, and no additional construction would be required.
Existing conveyance structures are adequate to handle the volume of
water and the legal analysis found that state and federal statutes and
water district contract provisions would allow the trade.

LAW LIBRA-RY
GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY

.

Assemblyman Willie L. Brown, Jr.
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February 6, 1985

In summary, the results of this research show that voluntary water
trades or sales, are feasible, economical, and legal.
We recommend that this report be circulated to the respective water
districts for their critical review and analysis.
Sincerely,

{2th15k;:
Arthur Bolton
Director
AB:sp
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Recently enacted legislation encourages water users to sell, lease or
trade water without losing their appropriative rights, provided that
others• rights, the local economy and the ecology are not adversely
affected. This report examines the economic feasibility and legal
requirements of a hypothetical trade from two San Joaquin Valley irrigation
districts to the water districts comprising the Kern County Water Agency.
Background

A growing amount of research suggests that voluntary trades of water
among water rights holders can result in more efficient uses of water,
benefiting both sellers and buyers, as well as the state's economy. 1 This
research culminated in legislation that cleared the way for voluntary

Gary D. Weatherford, et al., Market Reallocation, Market Proficiency,
and Conflicting Social Values, .. Western Water Institutions in A Chanain~
Environment (December 1980), in a report to the National Science Foun at1on
from the John Muir Institute, to be published by Westview Press.
11

Charles E. Phelps, et al., Efficient Water Use in California: Water
Rights, Water Districts, Water Transfers (The Rand Corporation, R-23
86-CSA/RF, November 1978).
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trading of water and water rights, but several questions have been raised
concerning the economic practicality, the technical feasibility, and the
legality of such water trades.
The 1978 Governor•s Commission Report

In December 1978, the Governor's Commission to Review California Water
Rights Law reported:
Just as the drought of 1976-77 focused the attention of
Californians on our sources of water and available means
for conserving these sources, it served also to highlight the principal strengths and weaknesses of the
state's water rights laws . • . . Jt provided an excellent opportunity for California to respond to the
invitation issued by the National Water Commission in
1973 to the states to modernize the law in order to
'secure greater productivity, in both monetary an~
nonmonetary terms, from existing water supplies.'
The report found that the water allocation system which had evolved
from the gold rush days contained several inefficiencies that arise from
the difficulties in transferring water rights among places of use, points
of diversion, or purposes of use. The "use it or lose it" philosophy of
appropriative rights was seen as encouraging inefficiency.
The Commission recommended making water rights more secure and endorsed
the concept of increasing efficiency by modifying impediments in present
law to make water more easily traded.

,.,
LGovernor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law,
Final Report (P.O. Box 100, Sacramento, California, Oecember 1978).
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The 1980 Rand Report
In May of 1980, a report published by the Rand Corporation, entitled
Efficient Water Use in California: Water Supply Planning, recommended a
change in the pricing structure of the state's water supplies and revisions
in the law to allow individuals and public agencies to have clear title to
the waters they use. 3
The 1982 Assembly Office of Research Report
In February 1982, the Assembly Office of Research (AOR) reported the
results of a survey of Sacramento and San Joaquin Valley water rights
holders concerning their willingness to participate in voluntary sales,
leases, or exchanges of water.

This report, A Market Approach to Water

Allocation, showed that 19 percent of the water rights holders responding
were willing to participate, and that at least 172,173 acre-feet would be
available for such transactions. 4 In addition, the survey indicated that
even more water rights holders might consider participating in a water
market if certain changes were made in state law.

3Efficient Water Use In California.
4Assembly Office of Research, A Marketing Approach to Water Allocation,
Sacramento, February 1982.
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The 1983 Env;ronmental Defense Fund Report

In March of 1983, the Environmental Defense Fund investigated the
potential for the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD)
to obtain additional Colorado River water by financing water conservation
investments for the Imperial Irrigation District (IID).

This report,

Trading Conservation Investments for Water, documented that substantial
amounts of Colorado River water, possibly as much as 438,000 acre-feet per
year, could be conserved by IID and used elsewhere without significantly
impairing present agricultural production within IID. 5 The study indicated
it would be both legally permissible and economically advantageous to both
MWD and its customers and liD if they were to enter into an equitable
agreement to salvage some of the water now lost.
Reaction to Proposals for Reform

The Governor's Commission report and the Rand report were sharply
criticized as being impractical and infeasible by groups such as the
Association of California Water Agencies, the California Farm Bureau
Federation, and the California Chamber of Commerce.

The Department of

Water Resources issued a critique of the Rand report which stated that the
11

major, and probably insurmountable. obstacles to the implementation of a

water transfer system as envisioned in the RAND report. at least on a
statewide level ••. is the resistance to such a concept in the water-rich

5Environmental Defense Fund. Trading Conservation Investments for
Water, Berkeley, (March 1983).
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northern areas of the state." 6 In addition, these proposals have been
criticized as providing an opportunity for depriving a region of its
livelihood, raising the specter of the fate of the Owens Valley.
The Legislative Response
Despite these criticisms, the Legislature enacted proposals to revise
existing law.

In 1979, Senator Vuich introduced legislation (Chapter 1112,
Statutes of 1979) 7 which protects water rights from forfeiture when someone
fails to use all or any part of the water due to conservation efforts.
Water conservation was defined to include water savings resulting from land
fallowing or crop rotation.

In 1980, Assemblyman Filante introduced
AB 1147 (Chapter 933, Statutes of 1980) 8 which provides a procedure for
temporary and long-term transfers of water or water rights.
In 1982 Assemblyman Katz, responding to the findings of the AOR survey
of water rights holders, introduced AB 3491 (Chapter 867, Statutes of
1982) 9 which provides greater protection and security of water rights wh~n
holders sell, lease, or exchange their water.

This legislation further

provides that:

6Ronald B. Robie, Director, Department of Water Resources, Statement
of the California De~artment of Water Resources, presented to the Assembly
Committee on Water, arks, and Wildlife at its Special Hearing on the RAND
Report, (May 14, 1980, in Sacramento, California), p. 3.
7

·water Code, Division 2, Sections 1010 and 1011.
8water Code, Division 1, Sections 100.5, 109, Division ? commencing
with Section 1210, Chapter 10.5 commencing with Section 1725.
9water Code, Division 1, Section 109 and Chapter 3.6 commencing with
Section 380.
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1

A water rights holder who has conserved water may sell, lease, or
exchange the conserved water without relinquishing the right to it

1

local water agencies may sell, lease, or exchange water, as long as
the water trade does not harm any legal user of the water, does not
unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area or fish and
wildlife, nor adversely affect other beneficial instream users

t

Water districts and agencies may act as brokers for individual water
rights holders

1

The Department of Water Resources, the State Water Resources Control
Board and other state agencies are required to encourage voluntary
trades of water and must provide technical assistance to persons to
identify and implement water conservation measures which would make
additional water available for trade

t

The depletion of an area's water supply, such as occurred in the
Owens Valley, is specifically prohibited; the sale of water is
allowed while protecting a region's rights.

(Thus, the amount sold

and the duration of the sale are always under the control of the
water seller.

For example, interruptible contracts to allow for

drought contingency can be drafted in the same way as those used to
sell natural gas and other resources.)
Colorado River Users Response

Despite previous skepticism, both the Imperial Irrigation District and
the Metropolitan Water District have recently committed staff resources and
time to the examination of obtaining additional water supplies from the
Colorado River which are now lost due to irrigation spillage and seepage.

-6-

On January 24, 1984, the Board of Directors of IID passed Resolution
No. 8-84 which reversed a previous position that any conserved water would
have to be used on IID lands and instead invited other Colorado River water
contractors in California and other possible recipients of any conserved
water to meet with them to discuss conservation opportunities including
cost and method of paymenf.
In December 1984, the District Board of Directors considered a proposal
by Parson's Corporation of Pasadena to eliminate irrigation spillage and
seepage in return for an annual percentage fee based on the income the
district would receive from marketing the conserved water to other
agencies.

Consideration of this proposal to have a private corporation

carry out the work took place after liD's special water committee in
ongoing negotiations with MWD had reached an oral agreement in
November 1984 that called for MWD to contribute money to a conservation
fund to be set up by IID. 10
More recently, the MWD reported approximately 350,000 acre-feet per
year could be saved at a unit cost ranging from $20 per acre-foot to $115
per acre-foot.

In addition to conservation opportunities with IID, MWD is

also examining the feasibility of additional trades with the Coachella
Valley Water District and ground water recovery and conservation gains from
lining the All American Canal •11

10carl Boronkay, General Manager, Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California, to the Board of Directors, "Prospects of Obtaining
Additional Colorado River Water for the Metropolitan Water District,"
January 4, 1985. p. 9.
11 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
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Unanswered Questions
While recent reforms in state law have made it easier for districts to
engage in voluntary sales and trades, four important questions should be
answered if these statutory reforms are to be fully and effectively
implemented.

These questions, which guided the research reported in the

following chapters, are discussed below.
How Much Water Is Available for Trade?
In necember of 198?., the Oepartment of Water Resources conducted its
own survey of water right holders north of the

~elta

in order to establish

data for a drought year agricultural water purchase program. Approximately
4 percent of the respondents indicated a possible willingness to
participate, and 15 percent said they definitely would be willing to sell,
lease, or exchange their water. 12 Unfortunately, because the department
transferred funds from this project in 1983-84, follow-up on the positive
responses never took place. The amount of water which could be made
available for trades is, therefore, unknown.
What Benefits Might Accrue to Sellers and Buyers?
The sellers of water may have to forego some uses and/or production as
a result of not having the water they sell, or they may have to alter their
cropping patterns to accommodate the drop in water supply. Sellers will,
therefore, need to establish a volume and price that more than offsets any

12 Robert R. McGill, Department of Water Resources, Northern District
Senior Land Water Use Analyst, to Patricia Schifferle, Assembly Office of
Research.

-8-

loss they may sustain and recover profits foregone.

Conversely, buyers

will have to obtain increases in their incomes to pay for the new water.
Buyers may therefore decide to alter production practices to take advantage
of the new water by producing more profitable crops or decrease existing
costs for current crop production by reducing expensive ground water
pumping. Will a trade agreement result in an economic advantage for both
buyers and sellers, and if so, how much?
Are Possible Water Trades Physically Feasible?
If a buyer and seller agree to trade a specified number of acre-feet,
are the conveyance systems in place to make the trade and are their
capacities sufficient? How much will the transportation costs add to the
cost of the transaction? These questions should be answered for a specific
water trade proposal in order to perform a realistic assessment of
technical feasibility.
What Legal Problems Stand in
the Way of a Water Trade Agreement?
The Assembly Office of Research survey found that water right holders
were reluctant to participate in exchanges and trades because they were
unsure of the security of their water rights and were concerned about
possible effects on downstream users or third parties.

Other reports have

asserted that changes in the law might be necessary for such trades to
proceed.

At the very least, a proposed trade should take into

consideration the situational or site specific constraints upon the water
rights and the contracts of the districts involved. Accordingly, this
study examines applicable state law, the rules and regulations and
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contracts of the districts involved in the hypothetical water trade to
discover possible legal impediments that might prevent these districts from
participating in a sale or lease of their water.
Study Purpose
When the Department of Water Resources changed its funding priorities,
it became apparent that it would not be able to complete the work required
to answer some of these important questions.

At the same time, the debate

over transferring additional water from the Sacramento River to the pumps
in the southern Delta was renewed in the legislature. Accordingly,
Assemblyman Richard Katz requested the Assembly Office of Research to
investigate the prospects of a regional water trading project within the
San Joaquin Valley as a more economically viable alternative. Specifically, the study was to examine the economic impacts to both the importing
and exporting districts, the physical feasibility of water trading, and the
legal prohibitions or implications that might affect such a trade.

-10-

CHAPTER2

HYPOTHETICAL CASE STIJDY
Study Methods

Because the answers to the questions posed on the preceding pages will
depend on the circumstances of a specific water trading agreement, we
decided to do research on actual water districts believed to be likely
buyers and sellers. The methods we used are discussed below.

Selection of Export and Import Districts
We selected two water districts as the 11 exporters 11 and one water agency
consisting of 21 different member districts as the 11 importers. 11 The
possible exporting districts (the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts)
were selected because these districts have ample water supplies, even under
drought conditions; the importing agency (the Kern County Water Agency) was
chosen because the seven detailed analysis units have, in the past,
required additional water and have been willing to purchase additional
supplies. 13

13There are 21 member agencies which belong to the Kern County Water
Agency. The reference here to seven component districts relies on the
Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 214 which suggests that, for
analysis purposes, these districts can be grouped into seven detailed
analysis units because of regional similarities.

-11-

University of California Participation

We sought and received funding commitments from the Public Service
Research and Dissemination Program and the California Policy Seminar to
provide research assistance to answer the economic and legal questions.
Funds were used for these research activities under the supervision of
Dr. Richard Howitt and Dr. Charles Moore at the University of California at
Davis and Brian Gray at the Hastings College of Law.
Importing and exporting district staff were contacted at the outset of
this study, but did not choose to commit district resources to participate
in this pilot investigation.
The results of this study and the conclusions in this report should not
be construed as an endorsement of an actual transaction by any of the
districts or agencies selected for study, nor should the study results be
interpreted as an intent on the part of these districts to engage in such a
trade.
Computer Simulation

Because we could not study the implementation of a real water trade, we
relied on recently developed techniques that use historical and current
data to simulate many of the complex interactions that would occur in the
type of transaction we hypothesized and to generate the likely results of
these interactions.

The primary tool was the Department of Water
Resources' hydrologic-economic model of the San Joaquin Valley, 14 which can
14oepartment of Water Resources, The Hydrologic-Economic Model of the
San Joaquin Valley, Bulletin 214, Sacramento, December 1982.
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be used to predict changes in water use and crop production as a result of
changing economic conditions and water supplies within specified ground
water and surface water delivery constraints.
Several components of the department's hydrologic-economic model were
used in this study and modified to predict changes resulting from the
hypothetical agreement among the selected water districts.
Detennin;ng the Amount of W
ater to be Traded

The Department of Water Resources' hydrologic-economic model was
modified in two ways to produce an estimate of the amount of water that
could be made available for trade if both the importing and exporting water
districts were to maximize their economic gains.

First, only the nine

"detailed analysis unitS" out of the total of 33 DAUs in the Department's
model were used for our study. 15 Secondly, to determine if there was a
quantity of water which, if traded, would benefit both the importing and
exporting districts, demand and supply curves were developed for the water
districts in the nine DAUs, based on several assumptions. 16

15While the San Joaquin Valley contains over 250 water agencies, only
' 54 of them are considered by DWR to be major agencies. These 54 agencies
were combined into 33 detailed analysis units {DAUs) for the purposes of
DWR's study.
16The amount of irrigable land was fixed and it was assumed that no
additional ground water would be pumped in the exporting area after the
water was traded. Only consumptive water use would be traded; the value in
use of the water in Kern County was based on ground water pumping costs and
imported water could be used to displace ground water pumping. Trades
would continue as long as the price plus transportation costs were less
than the incremental cost of pumping or the value in use in Kern County.
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The San Joaquin Valley Production Model, which simulates farming
decisions based on actual crop reports, farm production costs, and prices
received for crops, was used to estimate demand functions for water for
each study DAU. 17 Each demand equation for the seven Kern County DAUs was
adjusted to reflect transportation costs.

The demand equations for Turlock

and Modesto were used to develop implicit supply functions for the seven
Kern County DAUs.
The derived demand and supply functions were used to find the
equilibrium free market price and quantity that satisfied the aggregate
supply and demand equations.

This "optimizing" model generated both the

quantity of water and the price that each district would have to trade to
achieve the maximum total economic benefit--the sum of benefits for buyers
plus sellers.
Detenn;ning Feasibil;ty and
Cost of Moving the Water
The department•s "network" model, which determines the evaporation
losses for all channels, canals,

~d

rivers, and calculates the losses and

gains from subsurface flows for all rivers, was used to identify the
,
../

sources, uses, and losses of surface water as it moves among the DAUs to
calculate a set of water quantities which could be traded and to calculate
the associated pumping costs. 18

17oepartment of Water Resources, Bulletin 214.
18 Ibid.
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Projecting Changes in Production
The quantities of water and prices paid for them, calculated as
described above, were then entered into the San Joaquin Production Model to
simulate the resulting changes in crop production in each of the
participating districts.

limitations of the Simulation Model
Like all mathematical models, the techniques used to study the
hypothetical water trade cannot take into account the full range of
constraints which apply in real marketplace decisions.

The information

presented here provides a reasonable estimate of what would occur if the
assumptions of the model are accurate.

Other social and political

considerations may also affect a district•s or farmer•s decision to
participate in sales, leases, or exchanges of water.
not considered.

These variables were

The analysis performed by the University of California

researchers was designed to maximize the sum of the net benefits to
exporters and importers--in other words, the model was impartial in the
division of benefits between exporters and importers.

It is possible,

however, that exporters could bargain with individual users of imported
water to receive a larger share of the benefits depending upon other
variables.

This analysis does not examine these variations in market

conditions.
To provide information that will be relevant to a wider range of
possible water trade agreements (in addition to the mathematically
11

optimum 11 solution), we have varied the constraints of the model to show

-15-

the results when less water than specified by the 11 0ptimization 11 model is
traded.
Assessing the legal Constraints on Vater Trading
Examination of the legal implications and economic changes which may
result from any specific sale, lease, or exchange of water provides all
parties with additional information to evaluate the potential for a market
approach to allocation of water resources.

Existing law recognizes the

potential complexity of such decisions by providing for temporary water
trading mechanisms whereby such shifts may be examined before contemplating
longer contractual agreements.

The results of Brian Gray's detailed

analysis of the federal and state statutes, regulations, and contractual
obligations affecting the hypothetical water trade are presented in the
final section of this report.
Study Results
Amount of Water to be Traded
The model that optimizes economic gains to both exporting and importing
districts revealed that 153,486 acre-feet of water could be profitably
traded between the selected study districts at a base price of $38.78 per
acre-foot in the Delta.

Due to different transportation costs, each

importer would pay a different price, depending upon location along the
aqueduct, but all would receive water below the price they are currently
paying for pumped water.

Table 1 shows the economic effects on all

districts included in the study.
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0

Table 1
Economic Effects of Trading

153,486 Acre-Feet at $38.79 per Acre-Foot

Lost
Value
of

Sellers

Price
Per
AcreFoot

Modesto Irrigation District

$35.27

83,982 $3,257,182 -$1,776,159 $1,481,023

Turlock Irrigation District

$37.74

69,504 $2,695,726 -$1 ,384 '186 $1,311,540

TOTAL

AcreFoot
Sold

Export
Water
Revenue

Net
Gain

Cro~s

153,486 $5,952,908 -$3,160,345 $2,792,563

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------·--Net
Savings per
Acre-Foot

Buyers

AcreFoot
Bought

Net
Gain

DAU
254 Kern Delta WD, Rosedale-Rio Bravo WSD

$ 3.54

14,671

$

255 Semitropic WSD, Buena Vista WSD

$ 6.74

33,673

$ 226,956

$15.25

30,019

$ 457,789

$21.88

15,632

$ 342,028

$ 6.62

15,579

$ 103,133

$27.50

43,913

$1,207,607

153,486

$2,389,453

256 North Kern WSD, Shafter-W
asco ID

South San Joaquin MUD

258 Arvin-Edison VSD, Wheeler Ridge-

Maricopa WSD (part)

259 Be1ridge WSD. Berrenda Mesa VD.

Lost Hills VD

261 Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa WSD (part)

TOTAL
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51,935

The quantities to be traded are substantial even if relatively small
when compared to the total water rights and water contract agreements in
both the exporting and importing areas--2.3 million acre-feet 19 in the
importing regions and 1,051,846 acre-feet 20 in the exporting region.
trade of 153,486 acre-feet represents substantial economic gains.

The

Total

benefits to the economy would exceed $5.2 million per year if water were to
be traded from lower valued uses to a higher valued use in an area where
water is more scarce. Annual net returns to importers and exporters would
be $2.4 million and $2.8 million, respectively.

(See Table 2). Any

negotiations between exporters and importers could redistribute these net
gains in different proportions, depending on the relative bargaining power
of the two groups. Additional benefits that were not considered in this
study include increases in power production in the exporting districts and
improved habitats for fish and wildlife. 21
For comparison purposes, if the 153,486 acre-feet were to be traded to
Kern County at the prices indicated, this would amount to approximately
31 percent of the yield of the Through Delta Facility proposed in 1984 by

the California Department of Water Resources.

But this trade would cost

the importers approximately one-half as much per acre-foot, and no
additional costly construction would be required.
19 Kern County Water Agency, 11 Water Supply Report, 11 1983. Figure 7
p. 38. This figure represents the estimate of water used by the crops and
does not include return flows.
20state Water Resources Control Board, Direct Diversions for Modesto
Irrigation District and Turlock Irrigation District, 1984. This figure
represents direct diversions by the two districts and does not include
ground water extraction in 1984 of 197,077 acre-feet.
21 Department of Water Resources, San Joaquin District, Lower Tuolumne
River Water Use, 198 ~ .
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. Table 2

BENEFITS TO EXPORTERS
AND IMPORTERS FROM
WATER MARKET TRADING
Stanislaus County
153,486 acre ft.

Kern County

$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$

Exporters

Importers

Avg. Market Value: $36.35
Avg. Value in Use.. 20.56
$15. 76/acre ft.
Net Benefits

Avg. Value in Use
Avg. Market Price
Net Benefits

Net Profit

Avoided
Expenditures

$2,792.563.00

*Price includes average transportation and pumping costs.
**The value in use of the water was based on the production model utilizing
current water and changing crop pattern. This is a weighted average of
values in use ranging from $3.52 per acre foot to $38.79.
-19-

$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$

$66.42*
50.82*
$15.60/acre ft.

$2,389,453.00

Feasibility and Cost of Moving the Vater

Application of the Surface Water Allocation Model (SWAM) showed how
water could be traded from Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts in
Stanislaus County {DAUs 206 and 208) to the Kern County DAUs (See Figure 1).
The Modesto Irrigation District (DAU 206) would divert less water from the
Stanislaus, the Tuolumne and/or San Joaquin Rivers (junctions 1, 2, 4, 12,
and 14).

The Turlock Irrigation District (DAU 208) would decline diversions

from the Tuolumne, the Merced, and the San Joaquin (junctions 7, 12, 19, and
21).

Additional water would, therefore, flow via the San Joaquin into the

Delta (junction 8).

From there the water would be moved via the California

Aqueduct (junctions 24, 25, 110, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 99, 100,
101, 102) and the Cross Valley Canal (junctions 99, 98, 97, 68) to most of

the Kern County DAUs {254, 255, 256, 258, 259, ?.61).

Because this system

does not serve the districts in DAU 257, those districts can obtain
additional water by paying for Delta water sent to DAUs 256 and to 258 in
exchange for the latter's allocation of water from the Friant-Kern Canal
(junctions 40, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68). 22
Transportation costs vary, depending on the location of the importing
district.

It costs the Modesto and Turlock Irrigation Districts nothing in

operating costs to allow water to flow past their diversion points and into
the Delta.

However, the cost of transporting water along the California
Aqueduct, as shown by Curie (1983) 23 (see Table 3), is significant.
22 such exchanges already take place among DAUs 256, ?.57, and ?.58. (See
Assembly Office of Research, Marketing Approach to Water Allocation (1982).
23

M. M. Currie, "The California State Water Project: Ana lyti ca 1
Description of Water Allocation, Water Pricing: Conditions for Market
Formation and Market Activity," Ph.D Thesis, University of California,
Da vi s , 1983 .
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Districts located in DAUs 254, ?55, and 259 must pay the costs associated
with the Banks and Dos Amigos Pumping Plants:
acre-foot.

$5.43 + $?..39 = $7.82 per

Districts in DAU 261 must pay an additional charge for the Buena

Vista Pumping Plant:

$7.82 + $4.32 = $12.14 per acre-foot.

Likewise, the

districts comprising DAUs 256, ?.57, and 258 must pay the additional pumping
charges associated with the Cross Valley Canal:
acre-foot. 24

$7.82 + $10.10 =

~17.92

per

Table 3
Pumping Costs Associated wit h the

Reach
Number
1

4
14A
15A
16A
17E
29E
29G
29J

~pathetical

Water Trade

Name of Plant

nunit rate•a
$/AF

Rate $/AF

Banks Pumping Plant
Dos A.igos Pumping Plant
Buena Vista Pumping Plant
Wheeler Ridge Pumping Pl ant
Mind Gap Pumping Plant
Edmonston Pumping Plant
Oso Pumping Plant
Warne Powerplant
Castaic Powerplant

5.43
2.39
4.32
4. 46
10.34
37.26
4.87
12.83
4.76

5.43
7.82
12.14
16.60
26.94
64.20
69.07
56.24
31.48

•cu~lative

afigures are rounded to the nearest hundredth.
Source: Curie. (1983)

24 Robert K. Davis, Office of Policy Analysis, United States Department
of the Interior, personal communication to Tom Gossard University OT
California, Davis, Post-graduate Research Assistant, Agricultural Economics,
September 1984.
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Changes in Crop Production
The transfer described in this study could be accomplished with minimal
changes in cropping patterns and total water use in each area.

Table 4

shows the effects on each crop as a positive or negative percentage.
Table 5 shows the overall changes in crop acreage for the importers,
exporters, and the entire San Joaquin Valley.

The exporting region would

reduce irrigated acreage by 8 percent, and this reduction would take place
largely in irrigated pastures.

Since irrigated pasture does not use

significant quantities of purchased inputs--such as fertilizers, machinery,
pesticides, and labor--there are minimal secondary impacts on the local
economy.

The loss in income to the local economy would be offset by the

increased local income from the water trade.

Table 4
Changes in Crop Pttterns Resulting from Proposed
Water Trade, acres of production
Acres

Sellers

Irrigated Pasture
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Dry Beans
Alfalfa
Barley
Oats
Cotton
Specialty Crops
Trees
Vines

-16,000
-5,800
-540
-210
-210
-2,100
-700

TOTAL

Percent

(22.00%)
(11.00%)
( 6.001)
( 7.001)
( 6.00%)

(12.001)

0
0

(
(
(
(
(

0

( 0.001)

-25,734

( 8.131)

-174
0

9.00%)
5.001)
0.00%)
0.001)
0.00%)

almport area crop acreage changes are small with most of the
water used to displace ground water pu.ping.
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Table 5

0

Importers
Kern County
Water Agency

1,000's
Acres

950.000

1,000
900
800

700

Exporters

600

Modesto and Turlock
Irrigation Districts

500

400
300
200
100
0

Before
Trade

After
Trade

Before
Trade
-27-

After
Trade

0
Alternati ve Vater Trading Scenarios

We also examined the economic effects of restricting to 100,000 acrefeet the amount of water traded or increasing it to 200,000 acre-feet.

For

100,000 acre-feet, the benefits to the exporter would fall by 57 percent to
$1.2 million, and the benefits to the importer would fall by 36 percent to
$1.5 million.

The sum of importer and exporter benefits would be reduced

48 percent to $2.7 million (Table 6).

Thus, the exporters forego substan-

tial profits, and the importers are denied the cost savings from the additional 53,486 acre-feet of water that the original model solution allocates
for trade.

However, there would still be $1.6 million in potential profits

that could go to either the sellers or the buyers depending on the
bargaining power of each party in the negotiations. Alternatively,
$1.6 million could be assigned to the public treasury raising statewide
benefits to $4.3 million, which is still a decrease of 17 percent from the
value estimated for the market equilibrium quantity of 153,486 acre-feet.
Any increase in water traded above 153,400 acre-feet would lead to the
voluntary sale price exceeding the value of the water to importer.

Thus,

quantities traded in excess of the amount identified by the original model
are unlikely because the value to the exporters would exceed the value to
the importer plus the cost of the trade.

Clearly, trades would not take

place under these conditions without subsidized prices or extra
reimbursement for transportation costs.
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Table 6
Economic Effects of Tra~ing,
100,000 Acre-Feet at $26.12/42.18 per Acre-Foot

Sellers

Price
Per
Acre-Foot

Modesto Irrigation District

$22.60

53,823 $1,405,658 -$ 797,458 $ 608,200

Turlock Irrigation District

$25.07

46,177 $1,206,054 -$ 627,225 $ 578,829

TOTAL

AcreFeet
Sold

Export
Water
Revenue

Lost
Value
of Cro2s

Net
Gain

100,000 $2,611,712 -$1,424,683 $1,187,029

Net
Savings per
Acre-Foot

Buyers

AcreFeet
Bought

Net
Gain

DAU
254 Kern Delta WD, Rosedale-Rio Bravo WSD

$ 0.15

633

$

95

255 Semitropic WSD, Buena Vista WSD

$ 3.35

16,723

$

56,022

256 North Kern WSD, Shafter Wasco ID,
South San Joaquin MUD

$11.86

23,341

$ 276,824

258 Arvin-Edison VSD, Wheeler RidgeMaricopa WSD (part)

$18.50

13,209

$ 244,366

259 Belridge WSD, Berrenda Mesa WD,
Lost Hills VD

$ 3.23

7,598

$24.11

38,496

$ 928,138

100,000

$1,529,986

261 Wheeler

Ridge~aricopa

WSD (part)

TOTAL

$

24,541

aThe price and costs are for the sellers ($26.12) and the buyers ($42.18). The
difference ($16.06) times the quantity traded (100,000) gives the additional profit
($1.6 million) that could be realized by either the sellers or the buyers.
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Conclusion

A trade of water from Modesto and Turlock Irrigation districts to the
Kern County Water Agency is physically possible and economically beneficial
to both the importers and exporters.

The quantities indicated by the

models are large enough to be attractive to the importers, but small enough
(9.5 percent) so as to have a minimal effect on the agricultural practice
of the exporters. The questions about legal impediments are answered in
the following chapter.
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OIAPTER 3
LEGAL PROVISIONS AFFECTING EXPORT OF W
ATER FROM
MODESTO AND TURLOCK IRRIGATION DISTRICTS
In this section, we outline the scope of Modesto Irrigation District's
(MID) and Turlock Irrigation District's (TID) authority to enter into the
water trade described above. We then analyze the rules and regulations of
the two districts to determine whether they contain any additional
limitations on the authority of the districts.

California law

Statutes Affecting Irrigation Districts
The Irrigation District law, Division 11 of the Water Code, governs the
administration of the two exporting districts.

Pursuant to Water Code

Section 22228, the districts "may contract to perform and perform any
agreement with any number of persons or public corporations or agencies for
the exchange, transfer, or delivery . . • of any water right or water."
This authority is supplemented by Section 22259, which provides:
If its board deems it to
the district, a district
the lease or sale of any
water not then necessary
for use either within or

be for the best interests of
may enter into a contract for
surplus water or use of surplus
for use within the district,
without the district.

Although the Irrigation District Law does not specifically define the term
"surplus water," other provisions of the Water Code make it clear that the
determination of whether a surplus exists is left to the discretion of the
districts.
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Effect of Recent Amendments to the Vater Code

The water trading provisions of the Irrigation District Law were
recently supplemented by the 1980 and 1982 amendments to Division 1 of the
Water Code.

The purpose of these amendments is set forth in Section

109(a), which declares that it is "the established policy of this state to
facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and water rights where
consistent with the public welfare of the place of export and the place of
import." The decision to engage in a water trade is left primarily to the
participating agencies, rather than to any state agency.

The role of the

SWRCB, as discussed later, is limited to the protection of downstream users
and instream uses potentially affected by the water trade. Thus,
Section 382 of the Water Code provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, every local
or regional public agency authorized by law to serve
water to the inhabitants of the agency may sell, lease,
exchange, or otherwise transfer water that is surplus to
the needs of the agency's water users for use outside of
the agency. The authority granted to local and regional
public agencies by this chapter shall not be construed
as prohibiting or restricting the transfer of water or
water rights pursuant to authority granted such agencies
by provisions of law other than this chapter.
The second sentence of Section 38? makes it clear that this section
supplements, and does not restrictively amend, the water transfer
provisions of the Irrigation District Law.
The determination of whether the exporting agency has water "surplus to
the needs of the agency's water users" also is left to the discretion of
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the local water agency, rather than to any state agency. 25 According to
Section 383 of the Water Code:
For purposes of this chapter, water that is surplus to
the needs of the agency's water users shall mean any of
the following:
(a) Water, to which the right is held by the
agency pursuant to an appropriation made under the Water
Commission Act or Division 2 (commencing with
Section 1000), which the agency finds will be in excess
of the needs of water users within the agency for the
duration of the transfer.
(b) Water, to which the right is held by the
agency pursuant to an appropriation made under the Water
Commission Act or Division 2 (commencing with
Section 1000), of which any water user agrees with the
agency, upon mutually satisfactory terms, to forego use
for the duration of the transfer.
(c) Water, to which the right is held by a water
user within the agency pursuant to an appropriation made
under the Water Commission Act or Division 2 (commencing
with Section 1000) where the water user and the agency
agree, upon mutually satisfactory terms, that the water
user will forego use for the period of time specified in
the agreement and that the agency shall act as agent for
the water user to effect the transfer.

25The Legislature emphasized its general deference to local or regional
decisionmaking in Section 380 of the Water Code, which provides:
"The Legislature hereby finds and declares as follows:
(a) The various regions of the state differ widely
in the availability of water supplies and in the need
for water to meet beneficial uses.
{b) Decisions regarding operations to meet water
needs can depend in part upon regional differences.
(c) Many water management decisions can best be
made at a local or regional level, to the end that local
and regional operational flexibility will maximize
efficient statewide use of water supplies.
(d) The authority granted by this chapter to local
and regional public agencies ••• is in furtherance of
the policy declared in Section 2 of Article X of the
California Constitution and in Section 109."
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Thus, for the purpose of allowing a trade of water between TID or MID and
the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA), a water surplus for post-1914
appropriative filings would be deemed to exist if:

(a) the board of

directors of either district found that the district possessed water in
excess of the needs of its own users; or (b) individual users within the
district agreed to forego the use of a portion of their entitlement during
the period of the water trade.
The trading agency is not entirely exempt from the requirements of
state law, however.

For example, Section 384 provides:

Prior to serving ~ater to any person for use outside the
agency, the agency shall comply with all provisions of
the general laws of this state relating to the transfer
of water or water rights, including, but not limited to,
procedural and substantive requirements governing any
change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose
of use due to such transfer.
The Major Constra;nt on Vater Trades
The primary substantive constraint on water trades is that changes in
the purpose of use, point of diversion, or place of use may not diminish
the amount of return flow to the injury of existing downstream users,
whether they be junior or senior to the exporting agency.

This prohibition

is well established in the common law and statutory law of California and
is applicable both to pre-1914 and post-1914 water rights. 26 Section 386,

26 water Codes Sections 1700, 1701, 1702; see also Section 386
(post-1914 rights); id. Section 1706 (pre-1914 rights); City of
San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 28-29 (1921).
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which applies only to water rights acquired after December 19, 1914,
authorizes the SWRCB to approve a water trade "only if it finds that the
change may be made without injuring any legal user of the water and without
unreasonably affecting fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial uses
and does not unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from which
the water is being transferred." 27
Application to the Hypothetical Vater Trade

The prohibition against a change in the purpose of use, point of
diversion, or place of use causing harm to downstream users and instream
uses poses no significant constraints for the water trade outlined in this
study.

The most efficient means of conveying water from TID and MID to

KCWA would be through the California Aqueduct. Thus, water now used in the
two districts for irrigation would be bypassed and allowed to flow down the
Tuolumne River into the San Joaquin River and on to the Delta. The water
would then be diverted from the Delta at Clifton Court Forebay and pumped
south to KCWA through the California Aqueduct. Thus, instead of diminishing flows and reducing instream uses downstream from the districts, the
trade actually would augment the existing flow of the lower Tuolumne River
and the San Joaquin River.

Accordingly, the water trade would not adversely

affect any downstream users and could provide enhanced water quality
benefits to these users, as well as enhancing instream uses by increasing
the fresh water flow of the lower Tuolumne and San Joaquin Rivers.

27The procedures governing selections to change the purpose of use,
point of diversion, and place of use of water appropriated pursuant to an
existing water right are set forth in Water Code Sections 1700 through 17~6.
The role of the SWRCB in administering these procedures is discussed below.
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Downstream Users• Rights Limit
the Amount Available for Trading
The rule protecting downstream users does point up, however, an
important limitation on the quantity of water the districts may transfer to
KCWA.

Users downstream of TID and MID, whether junior or senior in

priority to the districts, have the right to appropriate for their own
purposes that portion of the water diverted by the districts but returned
to the Tuolumne Piver following the districts' use. 28 The rights of
downstream users to this return flow may not be impaired by the trade of
water to KCWA.

Thus, following the water trade, downstream users may

continue to divert as much of the upstream runoff as they did at the time
of the trade.

Accordingly, the amount of water that TID and

~ID

may trade

to KCWA will be less than that which the districts do not divert and allow
to pass downstream. The quantity available for trade will be limited to
the amount of water diverted and consumed by TID and MID (i.e., evapotranspiration). The amount would be further reduced by any transportation
losses such as deep percolation or evapotranspiration. The remainder--the
quantity diverted but returned to the Tuolumne River in the form of
runoff--must remain available in the river for use by downstream users to
the extent of their current rights to such runoff. 29

28Water Code, Section l?O?(d).
?. 9see generally Clifford T. lee, The Transfer of Water Rights in
California (Sacramento: Governor's Commission to Review California Water
Rights Law, December 1977) pp. 31-36. Staff Paper No. 5.
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Other Conditions and Limitations in State Law

Two other provisions of the Water Code define the scope of the
districts' authority to trade water to KCWA.

First, Section 385 provides

that "no water may be transferred pursuant to this chapter for use within
the boundaries of a local or regional public agency that furnishes the same
water service to the transferee without the prior consent of that agency."
Thus, TID and MID could not sell water to individual users within the
service area of KCWA without the approval of the agency.
Second, Section 387 of the Water Code generally limits the duration of
water trades made pursuant to Sections 382 and 384 to a period of seven
years.

If the water traded is "made available as a result of • . . water

conservation," as defined in Section 1011, however, the trade may continue
"for such period of time as may be agreed upon by the agency and the
transferee." 30
Section 1011(a) defines "water conservation" as:
••• the use of less water to accomplish the same
purpose or purposes of use allowed under the existing
appropriative right. Where water appropriated for
irrigation purposes is not used by reason of land
fallowing or crop rotation, the reduced usage shall be
deemed water conservation for purposes of this section.
The potential water trade presented here would involve water made available
from existing uses within TID and MID as a result of diminished
consumption, land fallowing, and crop rotation. Accordingly, the surplus
would consist of water "made available as a result of water conservation"

30water Code Section 387.
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within the meaning of Sections 387 and 1011. The general seven-year time
limit set forth in Section 387 would, therefore, not be applicable. 31
District Rules and Regulations
The rules and regulations governing TID and MID do not limit the water
trading authority granted to the districts by state law. The Rules and
Regulations Governing the Distribution of Water in the Modesto Irrigation
District (1950) do not address the subject of water trades. The Rules and
Regulations Governing the Distribution of Water in the Turlock Irrigation
District (1975) do not directly discuss the trading of water out of the
district, but de contain a few provisions that might be considered relevant
to the subject. 32
For example, Rule 3 provides that "only land suitably prepared for
irrigation shall receive water." Rule 8 states that "no irrigator shall
be entitled to a greater amount of water for irrigation than he can

31 The Irrigation District Law and regulations promulgated thereunder

provide that any contract for the sale of water for a period of more than
three years must be approved by the State Treasurer. Water Code
Section 22260; 10 Cal. Adm. Code Section 1858; see Water Code
Sections 20001 and 20002. It is not clear whether this requirement is
applicable to transfers of water by Irrigation Districts pursuant to
Sections 380 through 387 of the Water Code.
32 Paragraph 16 is entitled the "Rule Regulating the Transfer of Water,"
but it deals only with intra-district transfPrs rather than transfers out
of the district. Paragraph 16 provides in relevant part:
Parcels of land under the same ownership when farmed by
the owner or rented to a single renter may transfer
water under his allotment from one of his parcels to
another; or, he may transfer water to land he rents to
another from land he owns; also, from land he owns to
land he rents from another; but, he cannot transfer any
water from rented land to his own land. Water is not
transferable from one rented parcel of one ownership to
any other rented parcel of another ownership.
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economically and beneficially use without waste."

Finally, Rule 15 limits

the supply of water delivered to the members of TID in normal years to four
acre-feet per acre.

Members may obtain additional water only if the TIO

Board of Directors determines that a surplus exists.

State Law Supersedes District Rules
that Might Restrict Water Export
Because these district rules govern the rights of individual TID
members only, they cannot be construed as limiting the power the Water Code
grants to trade surplus water to KCWA.

The rules might be interpreted as

restricting the authority of individual members of TID to sell a portion of
their water allotment because the rules imply that water will be supplied
to the members of TID only for irrigation of their own land.

This

interpretation would be invalid under state law because it dirP.ctly
conflicts with Sections 381 and 383 of the Water Code.

Section 383

empowers the members of local water agencies such as TID to forego the use
of water allotted to them and, with the consent of the agency, to trade
this water to other users.

According to Section 3P.1, this authority "shall

control over any other provision of law which contains more stringent
limitations on the authority of a particular public agency to serve water
for use outside the agency, to the extent those other laws are inconsistent
with the authority granted herein."
Inasmuch as the rules and regulations governing TID do not expressly
address the authority of district members to sell surplus water, they do
not conflict with state law.

The few rules discussed above that might be

interpreted as affecting the members' authority to trade water must be
interpreted so as to conform with state law.
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Accordingly, consistent with

Section 381, those rules do not limit the ability of the members of TID to
sell watPr to KCWA pursuant to the terms of Section 383.
Legal Provisions Affecting the Kern County
Vater Agency's Importation of Water

The authority of the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) to purchase water
from TID or MID is governed by California water law, the agency's enabling
legislation, and its contracts with DWR and the individual member units of
the agency.
California law

Under Section 385 of the

~later

Code, TID or MID is prohibited from

selling water to industrial members of KCWA without the agency's approval.
Kern County Vater Agency Act

The KCWA was established by special act of the Legislature "primarily
for the purpose of acquiring water supplies for its member units." 33 The
agency's enabling legislation, the Kern County Water Agency Act, is set
forth in Chapter 99 of the Appendix to the commercial compilation
(West's Annotated California Codes) of the Water Code.
The act grants the agency ample authority to purchase water from TJD or
MID.

Section 4 empowers KCWA "to do any and every lawful act necessary in

order that sufficient water may be available for any present or future

33 stat s. 1961, ch. 1003, p. 2652, Section 1.
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beneficial use or uses of the lands or inhabitants within the agency." The
authority to enter into contracts and "to do all acts necessary for the
full exercise of its purposes and powers .. is conferred in Section 3.6.

In

addition, Section 4.3 specifically empowers the agency "(a) to appropriate
and acquire water and water rights ••• and (d) to import water into the
agency and to conserve and utilize . . . water for any purpose useful to
the agency or the member units thereof ...

Finally, Section 4.4 provides:

The agency shall have the power within or outside the
agency to construct, purchase, lease, or otherwise
acquire works and to purchase, lease, appropriate or
otherwise acquire water and water rights useful or
necessary to make use of water for any purposes
authorized by this act.

Department of Water Resources Contract
KCWA now purchases almost all of its imported water supply from the
Department of Water Resources, which operates the State Water Project.

Its

contract with the department neither prohibits KCWA from purchasing water
from other sources nor requires it to request water in addition to its
contractual entitlement from DWR before obtaining water elsewhere. Thus,
nothing in the agency•s contract with DWR would prevent the agency from
purchasing water from TID or MID in addition to its State Water Project
supply. 34

34Two other provisions of KCwA•s contracts with its member units-Articles 12(c ) and 19(b) -- will be discussed later.
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Kern County Wat er Agency Member Unit Contracts
As with the rules and regulations of TID and MID, KCWA's contracts with
its member units do not directly address the subject of water trades.
Article 5(b) of the contracts, however, could be construed as limiting the
agency's ability to purchase water from TID or MJo. 35
Requ;rement to Augment Member Unit Supplies
Article 5 defines each member unit's annual entitlement to water.
Article 5(b) authorizes a member unit to request water in addition to its
annual entitlement and requires that "to the extent possible and necessary
the Agency shall meet such requests for additional water by purchasing
surplus water from the State."

35 KCWA is required to purchase specified quantities of water each year
from DWR; these annual quantities are listed in Table A of the contract.
According to Section 33(a):
The Agency's failure or refusal to accept delivery of
project water to which it is entitled under Article 6(b)
shall in no way relieve the Agency of its obligation to
make payments to the State as provided for in this
contract. The State, however, shall make reasonable
efforts to dispose of any water made available to but
not required by the Agency and any net revenues from
such disposal shall be credited pursuant to Article 21.
Thus, if the Agency's purchases from TID or MID were to reduce its demand
for SWP water below the quantities listed in Table A, the Agency might be
required to continue payment to DWR for the water not taken. Section 7(a)
of the contract provides that KCWA may request D~!R to reduce the quantities
listed in Table A. DWR may grant this request if the "financial
feasibility of the project facilities" would not be impaired.
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The contracts thus impose a duty on

KC~IA

to use its best efforts to

augment existing supplies in order to meet the

deman~s

of its member units.

Article S(b) requires the agency to purchase such water from DWR.

This

language might be interpreted as requiring KCWA to attempt to purchase
State Water Project water before it could buy water from TID or MID.

It

would be more reasonable, however, to interpret the terms of Article 5(b)
as simply embodying the assumption that
KC~~·s

D~!R

would be the primary source of

water supply and that the agency would direct its requests for

additional supplies to DWR, as well.

Indeed, a contrary construction of

Article S(b) would be inconsistent with the KCWA's contract with DWR,
which neither prohibits the agency from procuring water from other sources
nor requires it to purchase water in addition to its annual entitlement
from DWR if such water is available. Moreover, in view of Water Code
Section 109(b), which directs DWR "to encourage voluntary transfers of
water," it would be difficult to argue that Article S(b) of KCWA's
contracts with its own member units grants DWR the right to insist that the
agency satisfy the additional demands of its member units only from State
Water Rights water.

Additional Questions Concerning the Legal
·
Complicat;ons of Vater Trading
While state law and district and agency rules and contracts do not
prevent a trade, there are several other questions that affpct the
implementation of this transaction. These questions and their answers
follow:
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Could the Trade be Arranged Between
Individual Members of TID or MID and KCWA?
The Agency May Act as A Broker
As discussed above, Section 383 of the Water Code defines the methods
by which a local water agency may determine that surplus water exists,
which it then may trade to other users. 36 If the water right is held by
the agency, the agency itself may conclude that a certain portion of its
water is surplus to the needs of the agency as a whole. 37 Alternatively,
the agency and individual users within the agency may decide that those
users have surplus water, which may be traded without affecting the water
allotments of other users within the agency. 38 If, on the other hand, the
water right is hPld by individual users within the agency, those users and
the agency may agree that the users possess surplus water, which the
individual or agency may trade on behalf of the users. 39 In each case, the
agency, rather than the individual users, may act as the broker of the
water. 40

36water Code Section 383.
37water Code Section 383(a).
38

water Code, Section 3P3(b). Transfer of individual water users'
allotments could not have been possible without the 1982 amendment to the
~later Code.
Under the Irrigation District Law, no water allotted to a
member of ah irrigation district may be assigned by the allottee for any
use outside the district. Water Code Section 22251; Jenison v. Redfield,
149 Cal. 500 (1906).
39water Code Section 383(c).
40
Where the rights to thP water being transferred are held by
individual users rather than the agency, Section 383(c) specifies that "the
agency shall act as agent for the water user to effect the transfer only
where the agency and individual agree."
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Alternative Ways of Arrang;ng the Water Trade

Thus, the proposed trade in this study could be structured with TID or
MID in one of three ways.

First, the district itself could decide to trade

water to which it holds appropriative rights. The district would determine
that it possesses water in excess of the needs of its members generally anc
trade some or all of the surplus to KCWA or its member units. Second, the
district and certain of its individual members could agree to trade water
to which the district holds appropriative rights and of which the
participating members agree to forego the use during the term of the trade.
Third, the district and certain users within the district could agree to
trade water to which the users hold appropriative rights and of which the
participating users agree to forego the use during the term of the trade.
In this last situation, the district essentially acts as a broker on behalf
of the users that participate in the trade.
Distribution of Revenues

Because the districts are prohibited by California law from earning a
profit, 41 net revenues received by TID or MID must be distributed to the
individual members of the district.

Under the first alternative discussed

above--where the district trades surplus water to which it holds
appropriative rights in trust for all of its members--the most equitable
method of distributing net revenues would be through a general disposition
to all members of the district.

Under the second and third alternatives--

which involve the trades of individual members' allotments of water or of

41 see Phelps, Efficient Water Use in California, p.8.
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their own

rights--th~

most equitable method of distributing profits would

be to 1imit the distributions to those members of TID or MID that
participate in the trade.
Fewer Restr;ct;ons on Purchas;ng Agenc;es
While Section 383 requires in specified situations that the districts
be parties to the kinds of trades just discussed, there is no equivalent
requirement with respect to the purchasers of the water. Thus, KCWA may
buy water from TID or MID for distribution to its members units, or certain
member units (or their own water users) may purchase water directly from
Tin or MID if KCWA approves and such a trade meets any contractual
limitations between KCWA and its members or users. 42

As discussed previously, ~rater Code Section 385 would require TID and
MID to obtain the consent of KCWA before the districts could sell water to
individual users within the agency's service area.
42

Tn addition, two provisions of the agency's contracts with its member
units are relevant to the member units' authority to purchase water from
TID or MID.
First, according to Article 19(b) of the contract, if a member unit's
purchases were to reduce its demand for State Water Project water supplied
by KCWA below the amount to which the member unit is entitled under its
contract with the agency, it, nonetheless, would be obligated to pay for
the unused water under the terms of the contract. The agency is required,
however, to "make reasonable efforts to dispose of any water made available
to but not required by the Member Unit and, to the extent of the Member
Unit's obligation, rto credit1 any net revenue from such disposal •.• to
the Member Unit." Article 19(b).
Second, the purchase of water from TID and Min could affect the
obligation of participating member units to pay the surcharge imposed by
Article 15 of the contract for State Water Project water used on "excess
land." Article 15(c ) provides in relevant part:
In the event that the Member Unit or water user
cowingles project water with water from another source
in a common distribution system, the Member Unit shall,

11
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What Is the Role of the State uater Resources
Control Board with Respect to the W
ater Trade?

As discussed previously, the principal authority to determine whether
to trade water to KCWA is vested in TID and MID. This authority is not
exclusive, however.

Section 384 of the Water Code directs that:

prior to serving water to any person for use outside the
agency, the agency shall comply with all provisions of
the general laws of this state relating to the transfer
of water or water rights, including, but not limited to,
procedural and substantive requirements governing any
change in point of diversion, place of use, or purpose
of use due to such transfer.

42 (footnote continued)
in complying with the provisions of this Article, and on
behalf of the State of California, adhere to the
following rules:
(1) If the amount of nonproject water applied in any
year within the area served with project water by the
Member Unit is equal to or greater than the amount of
water put to use on all excess land within that area
during such year, it shall be presumed that the water
put to use on such excess land is nonproject water, and
there shall be no surcharge to water users in that area.
(2) If the amount of nonproject water applied in any
year within the area served with project water by the
Member Unit is less than the amount of water put to use
on all excess land within that area during such year, it
shall be presumed, for the purpose of determining the
payments to be made under the surcharge by water users
in that area, that the amount of project water put to
use on excess land of a particular ownership within that
area during such year bears the same proportion to the
total amount of water so used on that excess land during
such year as a total amount of project water applied
within that area during such year bears to the total
amount of water applied within the area during such
year."
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The SWRCB is charged with enforcing these procedural and substantive
requirements. 43
SWRCB Approval Required
The proposed trade would alter both the existing point of diversion and
place of use of the water sold to KCWA.

The point of diversion would be

moved from the districts• diversion works along the Tuolumne River to
Clifton Court Forebay in the Delta, and the place of use would be the
service area of KCWA rather than the service areas of TID and MID. 44 Thus,
before the districts could sell water to KCWA, they would have to apply to
the SWRCB Board to modify the point of diversion and place of use
provisions of the permits and licenses for such water. 45 The board (or the
districts if the board so orders) must give notice of the application, and
persons potentially adversely affected by the proposed trade may protest. 46
If a protest is filed, the board must conduct a hearing on the proposed
trade. 47
43The board has jurisdiction only over appropriative rights that were
acquired after December 19, 1914, the effective date of the Water Commission
Act of 1913. The board does not have specific jurisdiction over pre-1914
appropriative rights. Water Code Section 1706 provides that the point of
diversion, place of use, or purpose of use of water appropriated pursuant to
pre-1914 rights may be changed if others are not injured by such change ...
lhis leaves the courts as the forum of first instance to consider injury
allegations, if any are made.
44See p. 21, supra.
11

45 water Code Section 1701. This requirement is applicable only to water
the appropriative rights to which were acquired after December 19, 1914. As
discussed above in note 25, the board has no jurisdiction over the transfer
of water held pursuant to pre-1914 rights.
46water Code Section 1703.
47water Code Section 1704.
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0

Approval Guidelines
In considering whether to approve a proposed change in the place of use,

0

point of diversion, or purpose of use, the board is guided by the standards
set forth in Water Code Section 386, which authorizes the SWRCB to:
approve any change associated with a transfer ••. only
if it finds that the change may be made without injuring
any legal user of the water and without unreasonably
affecting fish, wildlife, or other instream beneficial
uses and does not unreasonably affect the overall
economy of the area from which the water is being
transferred.

SWRCB Approval of the Trade Would Be Likely
As documented in the foregoing analysis, the sale of water from TID or
MID to KCWA would generate a combined net annual economic gain of
$5.2 million per year, which would be distributed to the various parties to
the trade.

In light of this economic gain, such a trade would likely not

be construed as "unreasonably 11 affecting the economy of the Turlock-Modesto
area.

Moreover, as discussed above, the water trade could benefit instream

uses and improve downstream water quality of the Tuolumne and San Joaquin
Rivers, because any water traded would augment the flow of those rivers. 48
In view of these factors and the Legislature's directive to the SWRCB "to
encourage voluntary transfers of water," it appears likely that the
would approve the changes in

th~

point of diversion, place of use, and

purpose of use associated with the proposed trade.

D
48 See p. 18, supra.

boar~

Would the Water Trade Jeopard;ze
the Water R;ghts of TID and MID?
TID and

~In

(or individual members participating in the water trade) by

entering into the trade proposed in this study would not jeopardize their

•
water rights.

State law very clearly precludes the forfeiture of the

rights to the water that might be sold to KCWA.
The Irrigation District Law states that "nothing in this article
authorizes the sale of any water right." 49 It also provid~s that "no right
in any water or water right owned by the district shall be acquired by use
permitted under this article." 50 Thus, if the districts were to sell water
to KCWA, invoking their powers under the Irrigation District Law, Sections
22261

an~

22262 would preclude any claim that they had traded not just

water, but also their water rights.
The 1980 and 1982 amendments to the Water Code also clearly distinguish
between the transfer of water and the transfer of water rights and allow
for the sale of water without the concomitant transfer of the rights to the
water.

Although the 1980 amendments declare it to be "the established

policy of this state to facilitate the voluntary transfer of water and
water rights," 51 the 1982 amendments authorize only the transfer of water.
Section 382 empowers local water agencies to "sell, lease, exchange, or
otherwise transfer water that is surplus to the needs of the agency's water

49water Code Section ???61.
50water Code Section 22262.
51 water Code Section 109(a).
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users 11 ; Section 383 defines 11 surplus water, 11 but nowhere discusses surplus
water rights. 52 Most important, Section 387 states that transfers
conducted pursuant to the provisions of the 1982 amendments must be for a
fixed period of time, generally seven years. 53 Thus, selling water to
KCWA, TID and MID would not convey any rights to the water traded, nor
would KCWA obtain any right to such water beyond the term fixed in the
contract of sale. The contracts· themselves could and should be clear that
the trade is of water use fo1· a term of years, and not a transfer of the
~asic

water right.

The 1980 and 1982 amendments to the Water Code also clarify that
transferrers of water do not forfeit any rights to the water traded.

Water

Code Section 1011(a) declares that the voluntary conservation of water is a
reasonable and beneficial use of the water conserved and states that water
made available as a result of conservation shall not be forfeited.

Section

1011(a) provides:
When any person entitled to the use of water under an
appropriative right fails to use all or any part of thP
water because of water conservation efforts, any cessation or reduction in the use of such appropriated water
shall be deemed equivalent to a reasonable beneficial
use of water to the extent of such CPssation or reduction in use. No forfeiture of the appropriative right
to the water conserved shall occur upon the lapse of the
forfeiture period applicable to water appropriated pursuant to the Water Commission Act or this code or the
forfeiture period app~acable to water appropriated prior
to December 19, 1914.
52see p. 46, supra.
53 see p. 39, supra.
54section lOll{a) provides that. the SWRCB may require vrater rights
holders who seek to preserve their rights to the water conserved "to file
periodic reports describing the extent and amount of the reduction in water
use due to water conservation efforts ••.• Failure to file the reports
shall deprive the user of water of the benefits of this section. 11
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This provision is supplemented by Section 1244, which deals
specifically

wit~

transfers of water.

Section 1244 declares:

The sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of water or water
rights~ in itself, shall not constitute evidence of
waste or unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use,
or unreasonable method of diversion and shall not affect
any determination of forfeiture applicable to water
appropriated pursuant to the Water Commission Act or
this code or water appropriated prior to
December 19, 1914.
Together, the above sections protect TID and
they would forfeit

t~eir

~ID

against claims that

rights to any water sold to KCWA.

As

discusse~

previously, t he water that would be traded would be water "conserved"
within the meaning of Section 101l(a), which guarantees that the districts
would retain their full rights to water made available to KCWA as a result
of water conservation. 55 And, according to Section 1?44, the trade itself
may not ccnstitute evidence of waste or unreasonable use of water, nor be
usee to

chal,t~ng~

the districts' rights to the water traded.

By Sell;ng Water to KCWA, Would TID and MID Assume
a Permanent Obl;gation to Continue to Sell Water?
If TID and M1D were to sell water to KCWA, they would not assume a
permanent obligation to continue to supply water· to the agency.

The

Irrigation District Law specifies that the transferee of surplus water
supplied by an irrigation district acquires "no right in any water or water
right owned by the distr1ct." 56 Moreover, the 198? amendments to the Water
Code require that

trans~ers

of water be for fixed periods of time only,

55 see p. 5~, supra.
56water Code Section 22262.
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generally for seven years or 1ess. 57 ThP clear implication oi thP.se
provisions is that the trade of surplus water confers no right on the
transferee to demand such water beyond the term of the contract.
Pccordingly, the contract for the sale of water from TID or t-'TI" to KCWA
should be written for a fixed term and could not, consistent with state
law, be construed as obligating either

~istrict

to continue supplying water

to the agency beyond that term.
Could Downstream Riparian landowners Claim and Use the Water
Released into the Tuolumne River for Transmission to KCWA?
The most efficient method of conveying water from the districts to Y-f\.'A
would be to allow the water to remain in the Tuolumne River, from which the
water would flow into the San Joaquin River and on to the Delta, where it
would be diverted at Clifton Court Forebay and pumped to KCWA through the
California Aqueduct. 58 It has been suggested that riparian landowners
along the Tuolumne and San Joaquin Rivers downstream from the districts
might be able to claim this augmented flow and thereby negate

th~

proposed

water trade.
From a theoretical legal perspective, the augmentation of the flow in
the Tuolumne and San Joaquin Rivers that would result from the trade of
water to KCWA is of no consequence, because it would not increase or otherwise affect the existing rights of downstream riparians.

A riparian land-

owner has paramount rights vis-a-vis appropriators and other nom·iparian
water users to as much of the natural flow of the river as he or she puts
57water Code Section ?P7; see p. 39, supra.
5RSee p. 23, supra.
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to reasonoble and bene~icial use. 59 l'nless there has been a statutory
adjudication limiting the riparian landowner to the amount of water
historically used, his or her

are not dependent on the quantity of

ri~hts

water put to reasonable and beneficial use in the past.

That is, he or

she retains inchoate rights to as much water as may be reasonably and
beneficially used, which rights may be asserted at any time aga i nst
appropriators and other nonriparian users.
downstream of TID an~

~ID

f)()

Thus ~

all riparians

presently have the right to enlarge their u5e of

water from the Tuolumne and San

~oaquin

Rivers and, if necessary to supply

their increased requirements, to demand from the districts and other
upstrPam appropriators a greater share of the natural flow of the rivers
+.har. is presently t'4Vailable to them.

Downstream areas do not have such

rights to ary releases of water from storage under seasonal storage rights.
The

propose~

water trade would affect neither the downstream riparians'

rights nor the districts' obligations not to interfere with those rights.
Downstream riparians have the right to demand and take as much of the
natura l flow of the Tuolumne River as they can put to reasonable and
beneficial use, regardless of whether the water is consumed by TID and
or is allowed to remain in the Tuolumne River for transfer to KCWA.

~JD

The

districts' appropriative rights are now subject to these existing and
inchoate riparian rights and will remain subject to them whether or not the

5qsee Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District , n7 Cal. ?.d 132 (1967);
Meridian Ltd. v. Cit and Count of San Francisco, 13 Cal. ?d 4?4 (1939);
Peabody v. City of Vallejo, ?. Ca ?d 351 1935 .

Creek Stream S stem, 25 Cal 3d
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~39

districts sell water to KCWA.

In other words, TID ard

~1D

would have to

reduce their present consumption of Tuolumne Piver water, if necessary, to
fulfill newly asserted demands of downstream riparians for additional
water.

The trade would not alter this obligation nor otherwise affect thP

rights of downstream riparians.
Could l onpart;cipat;ng Members of
TID or MID Object to the Water Trade?
If either district itself were to enter into the trade pursuant to the
Irrigation District Law or Water Code Section 383(a), 61 me~bers of the
district potentially could

challeng~

the trade on the grounds that the

district does not possess surplus water and that the trade would,
therefore, impair the members• rights to water.

Tt is unlikely, however,

that protesting members would prevail on such a claim.

As discussed

previously, both the Irrigation District Law and the Water Code confer
broad authority on the directors of irrigation districts to determine
whether surplus water exists and whether to trade such water to users
outside of the agency. 6? Thus, members of TID or ~ID who objected to a
trade authorized by the district's board of directors would have to prove
that the board abused its discretion in determining that the district
possessed water in excess of the present needs of those members.
If the trade were made between individual members of T:O or MID and
KCWA pursuant to

~later

Code Section 383(b) or (c), nonparticipating members

61 see p. 46, supra.
62 see p. 46, supra (discussing Water Code Sections 383 and 2~ 25~).
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of the district would have no basis on which to object to the trade.
Section 383(b) and (c) authorizes individual users within a water agency,
with the agency's consent, to forego certain quantities of water and to
trade the water for use outside the agency. 63 Thus, water sold to KCWA
pursuant to Section 383{b) or (c) would be either water that the district
had alrecdy allocated to the members participating in the trade or water to
which the participating members themselves hold appropriative rights.
Accordingly, nonparticipating members would have no claim to such water.
Could Adjacent landowners Who Have Relied on Runoff f rom
Percolation of Water Traded to KCMA Object to the Water Trade?

One method of structuring the trade would be for individual members of
TID or MID, with their district's consent, to forego the use of certain
quantities of water to which they presently are entitled and to have the
district transfer the water to KCWA. 64 Under this method, surplus
water would be made available for trade by the participating members'
(a) reducing their use of water on the land that they now irrigate;
(b) rotating crops; or (c) allowing presently irrigated land to fallow, or
by some combination of these measures.

If participating members were to

conserve water for trade to KCWA by one of these means, adjacent landowners
who have relied on the runoff or percolation of water previously used for
irrigation and now conserved for trade purposes might complain.
Specifically, adjacent landowners might claim they have a right to the
continued use of the runoff from participating members' irrigation

63 See p. 46, supra.

64 see Parts r, III, and VIIT, supra.
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practices, either for direct irrigation of their own lands or for recharge
of the groundwater table. This argument--which essentially is a

cl~;m

that

the existing irrigation practices of individual la.ndowners within TID and
MID could never be altered--would be ill-founded and, therefore, poses no
problems for the proposed trade.
Under California law, secondary users of water (i.e., persons who use
water runoff following use by another) have the right to

~emand

the

continued supply of such runoff, but only if the secondary us~r obtains it
from the watercourse from which the water originated. 65 Thus, users
downstream from TID and MID would have the right to prevent the

~istricts

from changing the point of diversion or place of use of water traded to
KCWA if the change would impair their use of the return flow from the
district's present users of the waters of the Tuolumne Rivers. 66 Secondary
users who obtain and use runoff or return flow from a source other than the
watercourse-of-origin, however, have no such inviolable rights. They may
use the runoff as long as it is available to them but have no right to
prevent the primary user from changing its point of diversion, place of
use, or methods of irrigation and land management even if such a change
would diminish or even eliminate the runoff available to them.
The California Supreme Court has held in analogous cases that importers
of water (i.e., persons who make water available for use at places other
than its natural watershed) retain paramount rights to the imported water
even though others may have relied on the water's availability by using it.
65water Code Section J.202(d).
66see p. 18, supra. As discussed in the text 2ust cited, because the
proposed trade would augment the flow of water to downstream users, their
rights would not be impaired. _
-59-

In Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation District, 67 for example, the district
diverted water from the Stanislaus River and used it to irrigate lands
within its boundaries.

Some of the water found its way into

Lone Tree Creek, an adjacent stream, in the form of "seepage, waste, and
spill ." 68 Stevens, a riparian landowner along Lone Tree Creek, had used a
portion of this augmented flow for ?.2 years.

In 1934, however, the

district constructed a small dam and pump station on Lone Tree Creek and
began recapturing the runoff from its irrigation practices, thereby
depriving Stevens of the augmented supply. 69 The Supreme Court rejected
Stevens• claim that he had acquired a reliance interest in the augmented
flow of Lone Tree Creek produced by the

runof~

from thP district•s lands.

The court held:
The producer of an artificial flow is for the most part
under no obligation to continue to maintain it. At any
time he may forsa.ke the practice, and lower users will
not have acquired a right against him, either by
appropriation or prescription, to the continued augmentation of the stream • . . • While rights may be acquired
by lower proprietors in and to such portions of the
foreign flow as have been abandoned by the producer and
thus made available for other use, these rights are
always subject to the contingency that the supply may be
interm i ttent or '5Y be terminated entirely at the will
of the producer.

67 13 Cal. 2d 343 (1939).
68 Id. at 345.
69Icl.
70

Id. at 348.
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In a passage that is highly pertinent to t he question under cons i de ration
here, the court also observPd:
One who, by the expenditure of money and labor, div erts
appropriable water from a stream, and t hus makes i t
ava i lable for fruitful purposes, is enti t l ed to its
exclusive control so long as he is abl e and willing t o
apply it to beneficial uses, and such r i ght extends t o
what is commonly known as wastage from surface runoff
!nd.dee~ pe,~olation , necessar ily inci dent t o practi cal
1rr1gat1on.
The Supreme Court affi rmed this principle i n City of Los Ange les v.
City of Glendale, 72 and more recently i n Ci ty of Los Angel es v. City of
San Fernando. 73 In both cases, the court concluded that Los Ange l es
retai ned rights to recapture water t hat i t imported into the San Fernando
groundwater basin, even after the water had been used by others. The court
held, therefore, that neighboring cities and water agenci es had no cl aim to
the continued use of the imported wat er once los Angeles decided to
recapture and use the water fo r its own purposes.
To summarize, while adjacent landowners have the right to use runoff
produced by the irrigation of neighboring lands, they have no right t o t he
continued supply of such water once their neighbor decides to irri gat e or
to manage its land in a way that reduces or eliminates the runoff.
Accordingly, landowners adjacent to members of TID or MID who migh t
participate in the trade of water to KCWA would have no right t o object to
the trade on the ground that it denies them surface runoff or percol at i on
on which they have relied for i rrigation of t heir own lands.
71 Id. at 351 (quoting United States v. Haga , 276 F. 41 (19? 1) ) .
7?.23 Ca l . 2d 68 (1943).

73 14 Cal. 3d 199 {1975).
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this study.

The trade of wate r from TID or MID to KCWA would be cons i stent

with, and in fu rtherance of, that pol icy, an d no new legislation is
necessary .

-64 -

CHAPTER 4
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

S

ary

Recent Legislation on Vater Sales, Leases, and Exchanges
Over the last five years, the Legislature has enacted laws to make it
easier for holders of water rights to sell, lease, or exchange water. The
intent of this legislation was that water would be used more efficiently,
benefiting buyers and sellers, and enhancing the state's economy.

In 1979,

Senator Vuich introduced legislation (Chapter 1112, Statutes of 1979) which
protects water rights from forfeiture when someone fails to use all or any
part of the water due to conservation efforts.

In 1980, the Legislature

passed and the Governor signed AB 1147 by Assemblyman Filante (Chapter 933,
Statutes of 1980), which provides a procedure for temporary and long-term
transfers of water or water rights.

In 1982, Assemblyman Katz, responding

to the findings of an AOR survey of water rights holders, introduced
AB 3491 (Chapter 867, Statutes of 1982) which provides greater protection
and security of water rights when holders sell, lease, or exchange their
water.

Unanswered Questions
The idea that a "free market" system of trading watet· could result in
more efficient uses of water has been criticized by the Association of
California Water Agencies, the California Farm Bureau Federation, the
California Chamber of Commerce, and the State Department of Water
Resources.

The critiques issued by thesp groups and others made it clear

that four questions would have to be answered if recent statutory reforms
are to be fully and effectively implemented:
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•

How

•

What

•

Are water trades physically feasible?

muc~

water is available for trade?

hP n ~fits

might accrue to sellers and buyers?

Are adequate conveyance systems in place and are their
capacities sufficient?
How much will the transportation costs add to the cost of the
transaction?
1

What legal problems stand in the way of a water trade agreement?

Study Methods and Activities

Because the

ans~ers

to the questions posed above depend on the

circumstances of a specific water trading agreement, we decided to do
research on a hypothetical trade between actual water districts.

We

selected two water districts as the "exporters"--the Modesto and Turlock
Irrigation Districts--and the Kern County Water Agency, consisting of
21 different member districts, as the "importer ...
Funds from the Public Service Research and Dissemination Program and
the California Policy Seminar were used to support research activities
under the supervision of Dr. Richard Howitt and Dr. Charles Moore at the
University of California at Davis and Brian Gray at Hastings College of
Law.
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Computer Simulation
We used the Department of Water Resources• hydrologic-economic model of
the San Joaquin Valley, which predicts changes in water use and crop
production as a result of changing economic conditions and water supplies,
to produce an estimate of the amount of water that could be made availablP
for trade if both the importing and exporting water districts were to
maximize their economic gains.

The San

~Joaquin

Valley Production Model,

which simulates farming decisions based on actual crop reports, farm
production costs, and prices received for crops, was used to estimate
demand functions for water for each study DAU.

Each demand equation for

the seven Kern County DAlls was adjusted to reflect transportation costs.
The derived demand and supply functions were used to find the
equilibrium free market price and quantity that satisfied the aggregate
supply and demand equations.

This "optimizing" model generated both the

quantity of water and the price that each district would have to trade to
achieve the maximum total economic benefit--the sum of benefits for buyers
plus sellers.
The department•s

11

network 11 model, which determines the evaporation

losses for all channels, canals, and rivers and calculates the losses and
gains from subsurface flows for all rivers, was used to calculate a set of
water quantities which could be traded and to

c~lculate

the associated

pumping costs.
The quantities of water and prices paid, calculated as describPd above,
were then entered into the San Joaquin Production Model to simulate the
resulting changes in crop production in each of the participating
districts.
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Assessing the Legal Constraints on Vater Trading
Federal

law~

state law, and the contracts entered into by local water

agencies and districts comprise the legal limitation upon any proposed
sale, lease, or trade of water in California.

Existing law recognizes the

potential complexity of such decisions by providing for temporary trading
mechanisms whereby such shifts may be examined before contemplating longer
contractual agreements.

Because the legal questions cannot be answered in

the abstract, we asked Brian Gray of Hastings College of Law to provide a
detailed analysis of the federal and state statutes, regulations, and
contractual obligations affecting the hypothetical water trade.
Conclusions
Amount of Water to be Traded
The simulation model revealed that 153,486 acre-feet of water could be
profitably traded between the selected study districts at a base price of
$38.78 per acre-foot in the Delta.

Despite varying additional

transportation costs, all importing districts would receive water below the
price they are currently paying for pumped water.
Benefits and Economic Feasibility
Total benefits to the economy would exceed $5.2 million per year if
water were to he traded from lower valued uses to a higher valued use in an
area where water is more scarce . Annual net returns to importers and
PYporters would be $2.4 million and $2.8 million, respectively.

Additional

benefits that were not measured in this study include increases in power
production in the exporting districts, improved water quality and improved
habitats for fish and wildlife.
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0

Feasibility and Cost of Moving the Vater

Application of the Surface Water Allocation Model (SWAM) showed that
water could be physically traded from Modesto and Turlock Irrigation
Districts to the Kern County districts.
Changes in Crop Production

The trade described in this study could be accomplished with minimum
changes in cropping patterns and total water used in each area.
exporting region would reduce irrigated acreage by 8 percent.

The
This

reduction would take place largely in irrigated pastures, with minimal
secondary impacts on the local economy, which would be offset by the
increased local income from the water trade.
Legal Feasibility

There are no legal or contractual impediments to thP hypothetical trade
examined in this report.

In some

instances~

provisions of state law not

only permit, but also encourage, this type of trade.
Recommendations

This report documents that existing law and

regulation~

provide

protections for water rights holders who decide to voluntarily sell, lease,
or exchange their water.

The report further documents that there are

substantial benefits to both the buyers ar.d sellers who participate in such
trades.
There appear to be few, if any, changes in the law which are needed to
facilitate such negotiated trade arran9ements between districts.
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lj'e recommend this report be submitted to each of the hypothetical water
districts for their critique and review.
Many of the legislative proposals enacted over the past years
be used at the present time.

We strongly recommend the report

~e

~ay

not

used to

stimulate discussions among water districts, the Department of Water
Resources, and the State Water Resources Control Board to ensure that
implementation of the legislation is feasible if a district or individual
decides to include such trade agreements in their water management
decisions.
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